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Reflections on Grace (Part Two)1
 
 
 In this second part, some of the main contributions to the reinterpretation of the 
doctrine of grace in twentieth-century Catholic theology are discussed. After 
outlining the new approach to grace opened up by personalist thinking before 
Vatican II, the article examines the understanding of grace that emerged after the 
Council—particularly within liberation theology. In conclusion, possible 
implications of jettisoning certain aspects of the classical theology of grace are 
considered. 
 
 
Among the new intellectual movements that rejuvenated Catholic theology in 
the twentieth century, the first to make a lasting impact was personalism or, 
rather, perhaps one should speak, in the plural, of varieties of personalism.2 This 
current of thought that had already emerged towards the end of the nineteenth 
century is associated with philosophers and theologians such as J.H. Newman 
(1801–1890), Max Scheler (1874–1928), Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), and 
Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950).3 Thanks to the change of climate brought 
about by such thinkers, the way in which basic religious questions – including of 
course the question of grace – were approached, was transformed. Personalist 
philosophers moved emphatically away from any consideration of man as a 
fixed essence or as a nature endowed with distinctive, immutable characteristics. 
Rather, they saw in man a being whose meaning or significance is to be sought 
in the relations in which he exists or which he is capable of establishing between 
himself and others, himself and the rest of the universe, and, finally, between 
himself and God. Personalist philosophies are frequently described as being 
‘dynamic’. As such, their approach was hailed as an enormous liberation, after 
1 The first part of this study appeared in the previous issue of the ITQ. 
2 See Emmanuel Mounier, Le personnalisme (Paris: PUF, 1950), 6f. 
3 See Herman-Emiel Mertens, ‘Nature and Grace in Twentieth-Century Catholic 
Theology’, in Louvain Studies, 16 (1991), 251f. 
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the predominance exercised for centuries by more ‘static’ or ‘essentialist’ modes 
of thought.4
 
 Personalism could be regarded as falling within the broad spectrum of 
existentialist thought and sensibility. Personalist thinkers considered that man 
transcends all that the human or natural sciences can know about him; 
consequently it is impossible to reduce him to what biology, psychology, 
sociology, or any other science could ever say about him. Since personalism 
affirms ‘the existence of free, creative persons’, it accepts at the very heart of its 
own philosophical approach ‘a principle of unpredictability that thwarts any will 
towards final systematisation’.5 According to Mounier, ‘The human person is 
not the most marvellous object in the world, an object that we can supposedly 
know from the outside, like other objects. The person is the only reality we can 
know and at the same time create from the inside. Present everywhere, it can be 
grasped nowhere. . . . The person is not an object that can be isolated and 
observed, but a centre from which the objective universe can be 
reinterpreted . . . ’6 Yet personalism is not an individualistic type of 
existentialism. On the contrary, for personalism the human person – a unity of 
body and spirit – is linked to a community to which it belongs, and to the world, 
of which it forms part.7
 
 Should this way of looking at man be allowed to guide the way one 
understands the meaning of grace, then grace ceases to be regarded as a divine 
or supernatural ‘thing’ or ‘substance’ added on, as it were, to the natural reality 
of the individual. On the contrary, one can begin to envisage the possibility of 
thinking of grace as a participation in the divine life, and as God’s dwelling 
4 See Francis Colborn, ‘The Theology of Grace: Present trends and future directions’, 
Theological Studies, 31 (1970), 692-711, an article that reviews the personalist ideas on 
grace of theologians such as J. Alfaro, P. Fransen, H. Mühlen, J. Mackey, G. Baum, to 
name only the better-known authors. By 1970, the personalist perspective on grace was 
well entrenched in Catholic theology, and a corresponding reluctance to stress 
‘ontological categories’ in any discussion of the doctrine of grace was widespread. 
Thus, in considering how grace could be envisaged in terms of an interpersonal 
relationship, Colborn comments: ‘This relationship is not so much defined 
(metaphysically) as it is described (phenomenologically). The important question to be 
asked is not about the essences of the persons involved but about the origin and 
development of the relationship between them’ (p. 694). 
5 Mounier, op. cit., 6. 
6 Mounier, op. cit., 8, 17. 
7 See E.-H. Mertens, loc. cit., 252. 
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among human beings.8 Grace can thus be grasped as a transformation of man’s 
concrete, historical reality, a transformation which will, clearly, have social and 
even cosmic ramifications. 
 
 
Romano Guardini 
 
 
 Romano Guardini (1885–1968) also contributed to the abandonment of 
too cerebral or rationalistic a theology of grace, and to the search for a new way 
of conceiving the relationship between divine grace and history. For him, the 
world – or creation, to use the theological term – and man, as part of creation, 
already are ‘grace’, since they were created by a free act of the divine will. But 
grace, in the strict sense, is the offer of ‘dialogue’ or ‘encounter’ that God makes 
to man in Jesus Christ. Guardini sees the connection between creation and the 
grace ‘of encounter’ in the following terms: man was created in order to find 
fulfilment beyond his own historical existence. Man is thus urged to transcend, 
in an encounter with God, the world in which he exists historically. Such an 
encounter is only possible because of the goodness and the will of God who 
invites man to seek him, and who himself goes out constantly in search of man 
in the course of human history.9
 
 
Karl Rahner 
 
 
 The thought of Karl Rahner (1904–1984),10 dubbed the ‘Holy Ghost 
writer’11 of Vatican II, had a huge influence on the theology of grace in the 
8 Cf. Gisbert Greshake, Geschenkte Freiheit: Einführung in die Gnadenlehre 
(Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1992 [new ed.]), 91–95. 
9 ‘God approaches man, gives himself to man and makes man capable of receiving Him’ 
(quotation from Guardini, ‘Gnade und Schicksal’: drei Kapitel zur Deutung des 
Daseins, cited by H.-E. Mertens, loc. cit., 252). See also José Martin-Palma, 
‘Gnadenlehre von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart’, Handbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte, vol. III, 5b (Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1980), 180–181. 
10 See Roger Haight, The Experience and Language of Grace (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 
1979), ch. 6; Stephen J. Duffy, The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern 
Catholic Thought (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1992), ch. 4; George 
Vandervelde, ‘The Grammar of Grace: Karl Rahner as a Watershed in Contemporary 
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twentieth century.12 For Rahner, as for Henri de Lubac, the existential reality of 
human life is one in which God’s grace is in fact always offered to man. The 
only historical order that exists is that of grace. ‘Pure nature’ is only a 
theological possibility, but one that has not in fact been actualised. Rahner, like 
de Lubac, wanted to say, without beating about the bush, that grace is, in the 
first instance, God’s own life, which God wants to give to man for his salvation 
and fulfilment. Therein lies for Rahner the primordial truth about grace, and all 
other questions about how man actually receives grace are secondary. For 
Rahner, too, there is a universal presence of grace in the world, since God’s 
saving will is itself universal. Consequently, Rahner can envisage a so-called 
‘anonymous Christianity’ outside the Church, a concept that was to be sharply 
contested by, among others, Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
 
 Rahner obviously wished to avoid ‘extrinsicism’, but without falling into 
the opposite error of saying that God’s grace is indistinguishable from creation, 
and is neither transcendent nor in any strong sense gratuitous, that is to say, not 
gratuitous except in so far as creation itself could be said to be ‘gratuitous’. His 
attempt at a quasi-squaring of the theological circle clearly created tensions in 
his thought, and may perhaps explain the occasional obscurity of his writings on 
grace.13
 
 The problems raised by Rahner’s theology of grace, are discussed by 
George Vandervelde, who suggests that it is not possible to provide, as Rahner 
attempts to do, an ontology of grace without compromising either the 
unpredictability14 of God’s grace or else the real relation that exists between the 
Theology’, Theological Studies, 49 (1988), 445-459; J.A. Di Noia OP, ‘Karl Rahner’, in 
David F. Ford (ed.), The Modern Theologians: An introduction to Christian theology in 
the twentieth century, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), ch. 7. 
11 See G. Vandervelde, loc. cit., 445. 
12 Cf. R. Haight, ‘Sin and Grace’, in F. Schüssler Fiorenza & J.P. Galvin, (eds.), 
Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan), 1992, 
433: ‘In the twentieth century no Catholic theologian has done more than Karl Rahner 
to restore the theology of grace to its position close to the center of Christian thought.’ 
13 See, for example, ‘Über das Verhältnis von Natur und Gnade’, ‘Zur scholastischen 
Begrifflichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade’, in Schriften zur Theologie, I (Einsiedeln: 
Benziger Verlag, 1954), 323-345, 347-375; ‘Natur und Gnade’, in Schriften zur 
Theologie, IV (Einsiedeln: Benziger Verlag, 1960), 209-236. 
14 And it would seem that ‘unpredictability’ is a minimum expectation one should have 
with regard to grace, given that it is even a quality ‘which quantum physics accords [in 
some measure] to inanimate nature’ (Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine 
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order of nature and the order of grace. Vandervelde concludes: ‘If God is truly 
the mystery presupposed by our being and our thinking, grace cannot be grasped 
by an ontology, i.e. by a human logos of divine being.’15 And according to J.A. 
Di Noia, ‘with the introduction of the supernatural existential conceived in terms 
of transcendental philosophy of mind and metaphysics, Rahner cannot provide a 
description or analysis of the natural order at the theoretical level that is not 
dependent upon the supernatural order.’16 The decisive anthropological notion 
of ‘supernatural existential’17 (übernatürliches Existential) turns out then to be 
quite ambiguous, for it does not appear to allow Rahner to respect sufficiently 
the relative (not of course absolute) autonomy of the order of creation; 
consequently, he is not really able either to respect the always surprising novelty 
of grace. This flaw, if it is one, could well be linked to another aspect of 
Rahner’s theology which has been commented on, namely that he does not 
underscore too strongly what one might call the ‘revelational’ value of the Old 
Testament,18 and hence of the doctrine of creation to be found there. For 
Christian faith, however, this doctrine is surely indispensable. 
 
 
Hans Urs von Balthasar 
 
 
 As is well known, it was Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988), in a 
critique some found slightly ungracious, others quite legitimate, who passed the 
[London: Arkana Books, 1989], 17). Unless, that is, one imagined that grace, in 
contradistinction to nature, should always be entirely ‘predictable’, a view which would 
in fact accord well with the notion of divine immutability. God could then always be 
relied on to be gracious. But that of course would still leave the basic ‘meaning’ of 
‘gracious’ unelucidated. 
15 Loc. cit., 459. This rather cryptic statement I take to mean simply that the created 
human intellect is incapable of grasping the reality of God the Creator. 
16 Op. cit., 126. 
17 The expression ‘supernatural existential’, like Balthasar’s notion (mentioned below: see 
n. 24) of ‘praecognitio inchoativa’, refers to the human capacity for, or openness to, 
transcendence, a capacity that is real but not satisfactorily definable. 
18 Richard Schaeffler, for instance, remarks, ‘that Rahner hardly ever took the revelational 
character of what the Old Testament proclaimed as a theme for his own deliberations, 
and frequently categorised in an undifferentiated way the history of faith of the People 
of God in the Old Testament as part of the history of the “natural” religions of 
humanity’ (Die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Philosophie und katholischer Theologie 
[Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 1980], 205). 
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most severe judgement on Rahner’s theology of grace.19 Balthasar could not but 
be uneasy about the notion of ‘anonymous Christianity’, an idea that was to 
became associated almost emblematically with Rahner’s theology of grace. For 
Balthasar, Christianity in no sense excludes the value of other religions and 
other spiritualities, but at the same time his ‘emphasis on the dialectic between 
grace and judgment also obliges him to emphasize the normative character of 
the revelation form, the sense in which, in its light, all other forms of spirituality 
are not only affirmed but judged.’20 There was clearly between the perspectives 
of Rahner and Balthasar more than a difference of emphasis. Although the open 
dispute between the two men only broke out after the Second Vatican Council, 
Balthasar’s reservations about Rahner’s understanding of grace go back much 
further, to the publication in fact of Rahner’s Geist in Welt (1939).21 With 
reference to Balthasar’s critique of this early work of Rahner’s, John Riches and 
Ben Quash write: 
 
There Balthasar warns against the attempt to build a theology simply on a 
study of the human spirit’s transcendence of experience in its judgments and 
actions. Such a move effectively short-circuits all attempts to perceive the 
nature of the divine freedom by contemplation of the world of objects. Should 
we not rather begin by contemplation of the natural tendency of Being to take 
form, by attending, that is, to the way in which the wonderful diversity of 
created things speaks of the sheer creativity of Being and points us to a source 
of creativity and freedom beyond Being itself which is God? It is this that 
kindled the wondering attention, the thaumazein, of the myth-makers and the 
philosophers of antiquity. Analogously, it is as believers contemplate the 
divine form of the revelation in Christ that their eyes are opened to the grace 
and majesty of God, and that grace generates new forms of life as it is 
perceived and obeyed.22
 
 To summarise the critical dimension of Balthasar’s approach,23 one could 
say that he is suspicious of any attempt to develop a theology of grace on the 
19 Especially in Cordula oder der Ernstfall (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1966); see also, 
John Riches and Ben Quash, ‘Hans Urs von Balthasar’, in D.F. Ford (ed.), op. cit., 145f. 
20 Riches and Quash, op. cit., 145f. 
21 A point made by Rowan Williams, according to Riches and Quash, op. cit., 145. 
22 Ibid. 
23 This summary of Balthasar’s ideas on grace follows closely the outline given by J. 
Martin-Palma, op. cit., 198f. 
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basis of an investigation of the structure either of our intellect, or of our moral 
sense, or of our affective needs. If we attribute to God the role of satisfying our 
desire to know, or our concern for justice, or our need for love, then from that 
moment on the danger exists that we will perhaps sacrifice the transcendent, 
gratuitous, and unpredictable quality of grace, and paradoxically kill the very 
thing we are looking for. 
 
 On the constructive side, Balthasar set about composing the multi-
volumed work, Herrlichkeit (1961–69), a theology that aimed to overcome the 
defects of an excessively rationalistic or analytical or moralistic (or even 
moralising) theology, by putting at its heart the ‘transcendental’ quality of the 
beautiful. This theology turned out to be at the same time a theology of grace of 
vast proportions. God does not, primarily, reveal himself as the truth one seeks 
to understand, nor as the moral law or goodness one should follow or strive to 
imitate, but rather as the beauty of an unexpected, free, and sovereign love to 
which man surrenders with delight in a willing act of adoration, because he 
wants to, and not because he needs or has to, or even because it arouses his 
intellectual curiosity. This divine love or grace is pure and self-existent; it is not 
oppressive or exploitative. In the perspective of this understanding of grace, man 
can remain other than God, and God other than man. This revelation of grace is, 
moreover, no abstraction: on the contrary, it is the revelation of a personal love 
which is perceived as such by the human heart, not by pure reason (if there is 
such a thing). It is this love that is at the basis of Christian ethics, but the 
perception of this revelation is not itself an ethical act. 
 
 While some may consider that Balthasar’s theology, like Karl Barth’s, 
seems to rest on unquestioning acceptance of the ‘positivity’ or sheer givenness 
of the Christian revelation, as traditionally understood, this criticism itself 
scarcely does justice to the nuances of Balthasar’s position. For, in line with his 
acceptance of the value of other religions and spiritual traditions, he does allow 
that there is in human beings a praecognitio inchoativa24 of the divine, to use his 
24 Martin-Palma, op. cit., 199. Literally: ‘inchoative pre-cognition’. See, for example, 
H.U. von Balthasar, Love Alone: The Way of Revelation, ed. A. Dru (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1977), 51: ‘[Man] certainly has a pre-understanding (Vorverständnis) of 
what love is; if he did not he could not make out the sign Jesus Christ.’ See, also, id., 
The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 1, tr. E. Leiva-Merikakis, ed. J. 
Fessio S.J. and J. Riches (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 167: ‘There is a natural 
religious a priori, given with the essence of the creature as such, which coincides with 
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own cautious expression. This capacity or ‘antenna’, as it were, for being in 
some attenuated way in tune with the reality of God, would correspond to the 
potentia oboedientialis of the scholastics, for instance, or to the ‘supernatural 
existential’ of Rahner and his disciples. Even for Balthasar, then, man is not 
completely passive before divine revelation, and hence before the grace of God. 
The prevailing thrust of his theology, however, has been to counteract any move 
that might reduce the reality of grace to the measure of man. But he has also 
pertinently argued, as already indicated, that if grace is be genuinely received, it 
will in fact always be embraced freely and joyfully – in a childlike way, one 
might say – by the human subject. 
 
 In view of the qualities inherent in Balthasar’s theology, Martin-Palma 
ventures to conclude that of all the current bids to reinterpret the doctrine of 
grace, Balthasar’s offers the Church the most solid and promising basis on 
which to present this ancient doctrine to the contemporary world.25 Certainly, 
his overall vision combines the two classical hallmarks of the theology of grace: 
respect, on the one hand, for the transcendence, gratuitousness, and 
unpredictability of God’s grace, and, on the other hand, respect for human 
freedom. As with all standard theological vocabulary, however, the key terms 
here are akin to the tip of the proverbial, always insufficiently explored, iceberg, 
though in Balthasar’s case, the exploration is already on a prodigious scale. 
 
 
Further developments after the Second Vatican Council 
 
 
 The Second Vatican Council was the first Council in the history of the 
Church to be held after the invention of television. The enhanced visibility this 
ensured for religious debate in all probability helped to heighten the profile of 
theology in the Catholic world, and may even subsequently have fostered the 
its ability to understand all existents in the light of Being, which is analogous to and 
points to God.’ Cf. Eamon Conway, The Anonymous Christian – A Relativised 
Christianity? An Evaluation of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Criticisms of Karl Rahner’s 
Theory of the Anonymous Christian (Dissertation: Maynooth, 1991), 256. 
25 ‘[Balthasar’s] theology has not sought the popularity of an analytical or praxis-oriented 
theology. As such, we can venture to predict that it will have a more secure future, one 
that will be more promising and hopeful for the Church. Since Balthasar’s theology of 
“doxa” is at the same time a theology of grace, it can offer a path towards a recovery of 
the theology of grace’ (Martin-Palma, op. cit., 198). 
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illusion that matters of great moment were now being aired publicly by 
theologians and other interested parties. Certainly, the Council was experienced 
as a liberation. At last people could breathe more freely, and say, and be seen to 
say, what they wanted, on all aspects of religion. But, as time went on, it was to 
prove much easier to cast aside perspectives that had grown too narrow and too 
rigid, and that seemed completely out of touch with the contemporary mood, 
than it was to find new, persuasive ways of interpreting the Church’s traditional 
doctrines and, above all, to create new forms of Christian living that could really 
match the achievements of earlier periods, ambiguous though these often were. 
Even making allowances for the temptation to idealise the safely distant past, it 
still seems fair to say that the movimenti that have cropped up the last half 
century are scarcely the equivalent of, say, the emergence of the Jesuits in the 
sixteenth century. This is not of course a moral ‘value-judgement’ on the 
former, or indeed, for that matter, on the latter. But the visceral intensity that is 
religion’s invisible – and also potentially explosive – asset, that deep, 
uncompromising, unforced sense of commitment and identity which, in the past, 
seems not only to have made possible the heroic sacrifices of the faithful, but 
also to have been, in less dramatic ways, existentially and culturally 
significant—that profundity has in recent decades not been as easy to conjure up 
as the ‘enhanced visibility’ just mentioned. 
 
 Put slightly differently, when religion is life, not an aspect of life one has 
to be made conscious of or about which one has become self-conscious, then 
key religious realities like ‘grace’ have a different ‘feel’ about them, than when 
they become problematic objects of reflection and study.26 That a change of this 
nature, characterised by the intrusion of critical self-consciousness into the heart 
of religion, has occurred in the Catholic world over about the last fifty years 
seems indisputable. It might be the case that an understandable fear of 
dangerous extremes, so palpably present in the ideologies of the earlier part of 
the twentieth century, has subtly modified religious attitudes in the West since, 
roughly speaking, the end of the Second World War, thus helping eventually to 
bring about the seismic change just alluded to within the Catholic world, and 
accelerating the general decline in the cultural significance of Christianity that 
26 In a rather similar way, as the American writer Mary McCarthy noted many years ago, 
‘being taught the Bible as Great Literature in a college humanities course . . . does not 
stick to the ribs’, in the same sense presumably as if it were an essential and 
unproblematic aspect of one’s life (M. McCarthy, Memories of a Catholic Girlhood 
[Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976; first published in the USA in 1957], 24). 
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has been noticeable since the Enlightenment. The Second Vatican Council might 
perhaps be viewed, then, as marking Catholicism’s loss of innocence about 
itself, with all that that implies both in loss—and gain. 
 
 The point could of course be made, and has been made,27 that heroism, 
traditionally a glamorous commodity in Western culture, is in fact a distorted 
expression of Christian faith. One could then conceivably take this notion a little 
further and argue that to foster ‘mere’ survival with some modicum of human 
decency might represent in fact more than a sufficient recommendation for 
Christianity (or indeed any religion). And consequently, in the sphere of 
theology (the Christian faith’s intellectual expression), the worst thing that could 
happen to Christianity would not necessarily be to lose its (phoney?) intellectual 
glamour. As against that, however, the power of the elemental forces28 that 
religion can still unleash and thrive on will probably continue to captivate those 
for whom ‘homeliness’ is not enough, and who want grace to be dramatic. The 
sublimity of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans may always, for some, be 
preferable to a God who is ‘simply’ gemütlich. This could, to some extent 
perhaps, explain why the profusion of well-meaning29 theologies of grace that 
appeared in the wake of the Council, failed to ignite much interest among 
contemporaries outside the Church. Even inside the Church, when, for example, 
Henri de Lubac finally had the freedom to publish in 1965 what he had had for 
so long to keep out of public view, this turned out to be a non-event.30 In an 
earlier age, a Jansenius (1585–1638), it is reported, would read the entire works 
of Augustine ten times, and his writings on grace thirty times,31 before 
launching into his own fateful exposition of the subject; but such an intense 
27 Hans Dieter Betz, for instance, argued ‘that in the understanding of Christianity, faith is 
a gift. Thus any attitude of religious heroism or of doctrinaire fanaticism will be ruled 
out as inappropriate to this faith’ (‘Ursprung und Wesen christlichen Glaubens nach der 
Emmauslegende [Lk 24.13–32]’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 66 [1969], 14). 
Less radically, Baron von Hügel claimed that, ‘The material of the Supernatural is not 
only the heroic but also, indeed mostly, the homely’ (quoted in P. Franklin Chambers, 
Baron von Hügel: Man of God [London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1946], 
11). 
28 Evoked, for example, in Yeats’s lines: ‘The Babylonian starlight brought/A fabulous, 
formless darkness in;/Odour of blood when Christ was slain/Made all Platonic tolerance 
vain/And vain all Doric discipline’ (Collected Poems [London: Macmillan, 1977], 240). 
29 One is reminded of the cynical piece of Germanic wisdom, that the opposite of ‘gut’ 
(‘good’) is not ‘böse’ (‘evil’), but ‘gutgemeint’ (‘well-meant’). 
30 Cf. H.-E. Mertens, loc. cit., 258, citing H. Küng, Existiert Gott? (Munich, 1978), 574. 
31 See Leszek Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 101. 
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level of interest in the classical disputes on grace, in the old quarrels over the 
relation between the natural and the supernatural, had long since declined and 
had almost entirely melted away by the time the Council ended. 
 
 Catholic theologians were now concerned to focus attention on the world 
of more immediate experience, even though the world did not seem to be 
turning with anything like the same enthusiasm towards the theologians. Some 
response, however, had to be made to the changing times, as the old cultural 
universe of faith rapidly began to disintegrate, without being replaced by 
anything of equal weight or cohesion. The Catholic world was in fact itself, as 
already intimated, finally being permeated by the sense of disorientation and 
unease that had long characterised Western culture generally. This feeling of 
disorientation, of being ‘at sea’, or of being ‘exiled’ from some happier or more 
secure or serene world, is doubtless more keenly, or perhaps only seriously, 
experienced in periods of crisis, when cultures (and religions) have to try to 
negotiate the difficult terrain between worlds they can no longer inhabit, and 
new worlds where they do not yet feel at home.32
 
 In the post-conciliar Catholic world, at any rate, the movement from one 
style of religious culture to a tentative search for a new one, got under way on a 
fairly broad front. Whatever the precise motivation and origins of the newer 
approaches, their proponents generally tended to accord more importance to 
becoming than to being, and to pay more attention to the historical 
consciousness of man and to his historicity than to the traditional metaphysical 
questions that had preoccupied their theological predecessors. In the new search 
for a credible Catholicism, however, the difference between ‘freedom from’ and 
‘freedom for’, was soon to be painfully rediscovered. The price of change, 
indeed, is still evident in the tensions that have continued to colour, some might 
say ‘discolour’, the history of the Catholic Church since the Council. But at least 
efforts were being made to seek appropriate ways in which the newly heralded 
32 In this connection, it is interesting to note that the West’s main foundational document, 
the Bible, itself not only incorporates a great transition from Old to New, but also 
contains many less dramatic, though still significant variations on the theme of crisis 
and transition. It may have been partly on account of such features of the Bible, that it 
was so easily embraced by the migratory barbarian peoples who were to form the 
backbone of Western culture. As for the periods of crisis and transition themselves, they 
may be symptomatic of a larger, perhaps even universal human truth, or they may be 
simply the expression of something more parochial, in this case the West’s own 
endemic restlessness. 
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freedom might find expression within Catholicism. Modern theologians sought a 
new language and, above all, a new basis in contemporary experience on which 
to develop an understanding of grace compatible with the new sense of freedom 
that was abroad in the Church, and worthy of belief in the eyes of a sceptical 
world. A sharp reminder of how pervasive this scepticism had become was the 
‘Death of God’ movement that emerged from within theology itself. This fairly 
short-lived episode occurred in the same decade as the Council itself, and was 
most intensely felt in North America. Although dismissed by some – perhaps 
too peremptorily – as superficial, it was still symptomatic of a more widely 
diffused malaise. 
 
 In the new circumstances in which Catholic theology now found itself, 
some sought to reconceive the doctrine of grace in terms of the unity between 
God and the world, stressing man’s free co-operation with God in the 
‘fulfilment’ of the created order. This was the approach taken by the Dutch 
theologian, H.A. Hulsbosch, who, exploiting the notion of evolution – 
popularised by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) in his occasionally 
unguarded writings33 – presented ‘a dynamic vision of the world’34 in which 
grace barely appeared to differ from creation itself. Grace, which before the 
Council had usually been referred to as ‘supernatural’, constituted in 
Hulsbosch’s vision the final phase of God’s creative activity. There was thus no 
longer any vital distinction between creation and the grace of redemption. This 
unified vision of reality had some points of contact with patterns of thought to 
be found outside the specifically Catholic world: with process theology,35 for 
example, and also with the evaluation of human experience in an increasingly 
secularised world that was characteristic of such varied theologians as P. Tillich 
(1886–1965), D. Bonhoeffer (1906–1945), J.A.T. Robinson (1919–1983), and 
H. Cox.36
33 See P.W. Medawar’s influential critique (‘philosophy-fiction’) of The Phenomenon of 
Man (ET 1959) in Mind (January, 1961), reprinted in The Art of the Soluble (London: 
Methuen, 1967), 71–81. Even more disquieting than his ‘philosophy-fiction’ are 
Teilhard de Chardin’s comments (in September, 1946) on ‘the spiritual repercussions of 
the atom bomb’. No mention is made of the bomb’s victims, but man’s newly acquired 
sense of power is stressed. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man (ET 
1964), ch. 8; cf. R.C. Zaehner, Drugs, Mysticism and Make-believe (London: Collins, 
1972), 175-184; id., Our Savage God (London: Collins, 1974), 248-9. 
34 H.-E. Mertens, loc. cit., 257; cf. also E. Yarnold, op. cit., 47–49. 
35 Cf. S.J. Duffy, op. cit., ch. 7 (‘The Supernatural as Process: Reframing the Problem’). 
36 Cf. Martin-Palma, op. cit., 185–192. 
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 Another significant, and perhaps more influential contribution to a 
renewed understanding of the doctrine of grace was made by the theology of 
liberation, which will be discussed in the next section. The potential of the 
concept of liberation as a way of unlocking the meaning of grace was felt not 
only in the ‘Third World’, where the best-known theologies of liberation 
emerged,37 but resonated also with some North American and European 
theologians, such as R. Haight,38 E. Schillebeeckx,39 O.H. Pesch,40 and G. 
Greshake.41
 
 
The theology of liberation 
 
 
 In the perspective of liberation theologians, grace was no longer 
visualised as a private, solitary reality for each individual, as allegedly, it was 
sometimes claimed, it had been in the past, but as the presence (or indeed 
absence) of God’s liberating reality in all aspects of man’s historical life. 
Liberation theologians underlined explicitly the political, economic, and social 
dimensions of the doctrine of grace, placing at the very centre of the Christian 
project the task of liberating those oppressed by ‘suprapersonal’ structures of 
injustice and exploitation.42 Illustrative of this shift in perspective is, for 
instance, Leonardo Boff’s preference to speak of ‘liberation’ rather than 
‘justification’,43 the classical term being now deemed too abstract to carry any 
serious meaning, at least at an existential level. At the same time, it should be 
said, Boff does not identify in any simplistic sense the human experience of 
God’s liberating grace with grace itself. Thus he can write that grace ‘mingles 
37 See, for instance, Juan Luis Segundo, Grace and the Human Condition (New York, 
1973); Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1979). 
38 See below, note 49. 
39 Cf. Mertens, art. cit., 259: ‘In Schillebeeckx’s work, the theology of grace is called 
“soteriology”. Another word is “liberation”.’ 
40 O.H. Pesch, Frei sein aus Gnade: Theologische Anthropologie (Freiburg/Basel/Wien: 
Herder, 1983). 
41 G. Greshake, Geschenkte Freiheit: Einführung in die Gnadenlehre 
(Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 19771); Gottes Heil – Glück des Menschen 
(Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1983). 
42 Cf. T.P. McCaughey, Memory and Redemption: Church, Politics and Prophetic 
Theology in Ireland (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1993), 66. 
43 Cf. Mertens, art. cit., 261. 
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with profane realities, without losing its own identity’.44 But for Boff – and here 
he echoes several modern theologians and thinkers, such as Nietzsche, Gehlen,45 
Pannenberg,46 and Greshake,47 among others – man has no fixed, predetermined 
nature. Rather, he is open to what is not himself and seeks to encounter and 
connect with the ‘other’, the implication appearing to be that it is God who is the 
ultimate ‘other’.48 Grace is, then, for Boff, the reality that makes this human 
openness to the ‘other’ possible and constantly sustains it. To the extent that 
man co-operates with (or even takes cognisance of) this truth, he encounters 
God. Such an encounter will of course also have ethical implications, which will 
have to be pursued in response to whatever specific socio-political contexts 
people may find themselves in. Although liberation theology is mostly 
associated in the public mind with Latin America, it has, as we have already 
said, not been without resonance in North America and Europe as well. Roger 
Haight, for example, spoke of ‘social grace’, and claimed that, ‘the movement of 
grace is toward the construction of social institutions of grace in every sphere of 
human life.’49
 
 Even though the heyday of liberation theology now appears to have 
passed, its legacy has continued and will surely continue to have undeniable 
strengths. Two important aspects of this legacy were, in the first place, the stress 
44 Liberating Grace, 214. 
45 See, for example, Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der 
Welt (1940); Urmensch und Spätkultur (1956). 
46 See, for example, Pannenberg, Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983). 
47 See Greshake, Geschenkte Freiheit (1992), 15–16, who invokes Nietzsche (and then 
Pascal) as endorsing his own view about the ‘unfinished’ nature of man: ‘According to 
Nietzsche man is “the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [tr. Hollingdale]”, . . . 
“the greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [tr. Hollingdale]”.’ 
48 It might be remarked, in passing, that to see God as simply the ultimate ‘other’ is not 
without its drawbacks. For God, surely, cannot simply be ‘other’ in the way people and 
things of this world can be distinguished from each other as being one thing or person 
rather than any ‘other’ thing or person. To see God’s ‘otherness’ in this way would be to 
fail to take account of the difference between ‘creator’ and ‘creation’, a difference that 
cannot be described in the same terms as are used to distinguish one aspect of the 
created order from another. Not for nothing did Nicholas of Cusa speak of God as the 
‘not-other’. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone: The Way of Revelation, 122. 
49 R. Haight, ‘Sin and Grace’, in F. Schüssler Fiorenza & J.P. Galvin (eds.), Systematic 
Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, 455-6. Cf. also Haight’s book The Experience 
and Language of Grace, ch. 7 (‘Liberation: A Contemporary Language of Graced 
Experience’) and ch. 8 (‘Social Grace: A Liberationist Theology of History’). 
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liberation theologians placed on justice as an imperative of Christianity, and, in 
the second place, the emphasis they gave to the dimensions of the reality of evil 
that undoubtedly transcend the purely individual responsibility of human 
beings.50 On the former point, it might be said that to restate the importance of 
justice for Christianity looks like restating the obvious – already explicitly 
restated in any case, if rather more circumspectly, by Leo XIII and Pius XI, well 
before the Second Vatican Council – but the obvious in theory is often at 
variance with the obvious in practice, and so constantly needs to be reaffirmed. 
It is one of the merits of liberation theology to have done this, even if its concern 
for justice occasionally does take on a moralising tone that somewhat dulls the 
expression of this concern. At its height, the liberation theology movement was, 
like many previous efforts at renewal in the history of Christianity, not free of 
controversy, too well known to be rehearsed here yet again. A brief 
examination, however, of two problematic areas of liberation theology – namely 
its claim that man has no fixed predetermined nature, and, secondly, what could 
be termed the question of its characteristic, quasi-Marxist rhetoric – might still 
be instructive for contemporary thinking on grace. 
 
* * * 
 
 The claim that man has no fixed, predetermined nature (a claim, one 
might add, not seriously undermined, indeed possibly enhanced, by any 
emphasis on the ‘situatedness of all knowledge’51), is one about which questions 
could be raised concerning, for instance, the possible link between the idea of 
the ‘indeterminacy of human nature’ and totalitarianism.52 Such a link would 
certainly complicate any direct or unqualified appeal to the notion of the 
‘indeterminacy of human nature’, as a way of elucidating the doctrine of grace, 
if stress were to fall too exclusively on the notion of ‘indeterminacy’, to the 
50 Cf. Eph 6: 12: ‘For we are not contending against flesh and blood, but against the 
principalities, against the powers, against the world rulers of this present darkness, 
against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places’ (RSV, Catholic Ed.). 
51 Rebecca S. Chopp, ‘Latin American Liberation Theology’, in D.F. Ford (ed.), op. cit., 
421. 
52 George Santayana detected, as Noel Malcolm pointed out (TLS, January 29, 1993, 6), a 
‘hidden connection between liberalism and totalitarianism (both presuppose the 
indeterminacy of human nature)’. When, therefore, a thinker like Ortega y Gasset 
asserts: ‘Man has no “nature”; he only has history’ (quoted by Van A. Harvey, The 
Historian and the Believer [London: SCM, 1967], 72), one could wonder what he 
means by ‘man’. 
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neglect of any other way of looking at ‘human nature’ (as God-created, for 
instance). For, while human beings undoubtedly have a changing and thus 
‘indeterminate’ history, can human nature itself be said to have a history, i.e. to 
change over the course of time, and in this sense to be ‘indeterminate’? 
Presumably it cannot, for otherwise how could one then ever have a sense of the 
history of the human community? 
 
 The very idea of the indeterminacy of human nature may, indeed, be 
derived from the Reformers’ (and ultimately the Augustinian?) notion of ‘total 
depravity’, that is, from the notion that, in its ‘fallen’ or historical condition, 
human nature is completely corrupt and has no intrinsic value or ‘meaning’ 
whatever in God’s eyes. Translated into secular terms, this would mean that 
human nature has no intrinsic structure or order,53 but is simply a tabula rasa. If 
this were accepted, it is not difficult to see how totalitarian leaders or thinkers 
could write their own script on this tabula rasa, with potentially devastating 
consequences. An alternative to this view would be to see – as traditional 
Christianity does – human nature in history as ‘fallen’, that is to say, 
‘disordered’ but not without underlying ‘order’, that basic order being God-
given. And in this perspective, grace would be seen as involving a reordering, 
but not a replacing, of human nature, and man would always have an innate 
sense of what cannot be foisted on him. 
 
 At the same time, change is an undeniable fact of human history, and it is 
tempting to see at least one of the generating factors of such change in what 
Nietzsche called humanity’s ‘abyss of indeterminacy’. However, surely such 
indeterminacy, which in any case cannot be total (if it were, how would one ever 
know?), can only be one of the factors that account for historical change, since 
total indeterminacy is both literally ‘unthinkable’ and, as was mentioned, 
incompatible with an awareness of (or is it ‘only’ a belief in?) the continuity and 
hence unity of the human community. It might be argued, therefore, that human 
nature, rather than being wholly ‘indeterminate’, is in a vitally important sense 
predetermined, in that it has a God-created form, even if we do not understand 
this form ourselves in any complete sense. Man, in short, is not free to invent 
53 An idea that Nietzsche applied to all of reality: ‘The total character of the world, 
however, is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of 
order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our 
aesthetic anthropomorphisms’ (The Gay Science, Bk. 3, §109, tr. W. Kaufmann [New 
York: Vintage Books, 1974], 168). 
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himself, even with the worst will in the world. For – to use more familiar 
language – it is the ‘will’ itself, the ‘free will’ of man, that is surely the factor of 
indeterminacy so many moderns talk about. But for Christianity human free will 
is ‘created’ by God, as a kind of divine ‘signature tune’ in man. 
 
* * * 
 
 As for the question of its rhetoric, it is noticeable that in liberation 
theology an assertive, ‘preaching’ tone was often struck by its representatives—
understandably, in view of the dire circumstances they faced and were 
committed to changing. It is of course also possible that the clerical origin of 
many liberation thinkers coloured their theological style. But the jargon-ridden 
nature of much of what they wrote threatened to undermine the intellectual 
seriousness of their project, and to make them, unfortunately, appear more as 
ranting and diffuse ideologues, than as reliable or profound thinkers. Not that 
they did and do not have a lot to rant about and criticise. But in contrast with 
liberation theology’s unequivocal exposure and denunciation of injustice, the 
revulsion at the cruelty of existence, expressed so powerfully by, say, an 
‘atheistic’ writer like Schopenhauer, might indicate that concern for justice is 
not quite enough to ensure even liberation theology a hearing beyond its own 
confines. 
 
 What such a contrast might also suggest is that liberation theologians, or 
indeed any theologians who believe in a good creator God, are precluded, by 
reason of their faith, from passing the kind of outraged condemnation on the 
world that, ironically, so enlivens the writing of a Schopenhauer and makes 
‘mere’ moral earnestness and exhortation pall by comparison. And indeed, how 
could Christian believers ever write as scathingly and uninhibitedly about the 
horror of existence as Schopenhauer did (even if they subsequently wished to 
bring in grace as the medicine for all human ills), and reject as contemptuously 
as he did the very idea of a good creator of the world? And if it be objected that, 
for their part, Christian writers are free to speak as uninhibitedly of the goodness 
of God’s grace, as the Schopenhauers of this world are to speak of life’s defects, 
this claim would still have to be made good in the face of the continued 
suffering of the world—a daunting task, if one accepts, as seems undeniable, 
that not all the woes of the world can be traced back to human beings’ misuse of 
their free will. Theology, it would seem, will never be able to trump the 
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indignant, exasperated pessimism of the world with a convincing justification of 
grace. But the consolation of theology lies in its belief that grace has finally to 
be its own justification. 
 
 Such considerations, while they may ‘on paper’ be valid – or as ‘valid’ as 
mental shadow-boxing ever can be – will to some undoubtedly seem abstract, or 
at the very least devoid of any obvious existential urgency. All the more reason, 
then, to let liberation theology at this point speak for itself and put its own 
strong card on the table. For, it is indeed one of the strengths of liberation 
theology that it desires to move beyond abstractions to ‘real’ issues in concrete, 
historical life. From a ‘liberation theology’ perspective, grace has to be, as it 
were, ‘enacted’ in Christian praxis, not simply ‘theologically interpreted’. 
Liberation theologians can argue they are not primarily concerned with 
describing or interpreting or reacting to the world, philosophically or 
emotionally or aesthetically, but – following Karl Marx’s famous assertion54 – 
with changing it. And the fact that Marx’s dictum – with its tacit assumption of 
the primacy of action over contemplation, or of ‘praxis’ over ‘theory’ – cannot 
be validated by argumentation alone, should not matter. For, the nature of the 
claim is such that presumably only practical results could count, in any case, as 
clinching or refuting its validity. 
 
 Curiously, however, at this point one can see how even a ‘liberationist’ 
interpretation of the Christian faith is faced by a similar problem as has 
constantly dogged historical Christianity, namely the continuing existence of the 
disparity between promise and reality. If liberation theology cannot appreciably 
change the world, any more than traditional Christianity succeeded in redeeming 
it, in a publicly recognisable way, are both thereby invalidated? Traditional 
Christianity can of course always appeal to its eschatology as its supreme court 
of appeal, postponing any final solution or transfiguration of life’s agonising 
conundrums to the End of Time. And liberation theology is at one with 
traditional Christianity on this essential issue, even though it wishes to stress – 
more urgently than perhaps was often the case in Christian history – the 
imperative of changing structures of oppression into ones of liberation. For it too 
54 In the eleventh of his Theses on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ (Early Writings, intro. by Lucio 
Colletti, tr. by R. Livingstone and G. Benton [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975], 
423). 
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believes the latter will never be definitive within human history.55 Liberation 
theology would thus see practical ‘liberation’ as an indispensable, but not as the 
only, key to unlocking the Christian understanding of human existence and the 
reality of grace. 
 
 A world-view like Marxism, however, unlike Christianity – even in its 
‘liberation theology’ mode (at least as represented by a figure like Leonardo 
Boff) – would seem to be committed to ‘delivering the goods’ within history 
itself. Christianity (and so too liberation theology) may be frequently, indeed 
even always, embarrassed, but it cannot be definitively refuted, by the 
continuing scandal of evil and suffering in the world, since its sustaining origin, 
it claims, is ‘not of this world’. Christianity is then only being consistent with 
itself when it refuses to grant the enduring presence of evil and suffering the 
same status as belongs to its own source. In short, suffering and evil can never 
be, for Christian faith, the ‘last word’—a belief that is also decisive, as shall be 
discussed below, for Christianity’s debate with pantheism. Considered from this 
perspective, grace might indeed be understood as the actual source of human 
hope—in specific terms, that which encourages human beings, despite the 
reality of evil, to wish to have a future.56 Or as Boff more forthrightly puts it: 
‘[H]ope reveals itself as sovereign courage (parrhesia), which endures and 
confronts everything in the certainty that it is fighting for the only thing that has 
a future and that will one day be revealed as the truth of all things.’57
 
 
The present situation 
 
 
 ‘The doctrine of grace is at present in a phase of radical change.’58 Georg 
Kraus’s judgement is confirmed by some recent publications. The Canadian 
Jesuit, Jean-Marc Laporte, for instance, who in the early 1970s had written on 
55 Cf. L. Boff, Liberating Grace, 155: ‘Historical liberations anticipate eschatology but 
they do not establish the eschatological state, for that would amount to the end of 
history.’ 
56 For Cioran, interestingly, the idea of the possibility of the future pointed to a more than 
human reality: ‘Every time the future seems conceivable to me, I have the impression of 
having been visited by Grace’ (Aveux et Anathèmes [Paris: Gallimard, 1987], 27). 
57 Liberating Grace, 167. 
58 Georg Kraus, Lexikon der katholischen Dogmatik, ed. Wolfgang Beinert (Leipzig: St. 
Benno-Verlag, 1989 [originally published by Herder, Freiburg, 1987]), 210. 
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the fairly traditional theme of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of grace,59 produced 
in 1988 a work on grace for the ‘first world’,60 in which a clear shift of focus is 
evident. Contemporary concerns, such as the interdependence of all human 
societies, the ecological crisis, and even the ‘New Age’ phenomenon, are the 
elements that now predominate. But also a more tentative approach to the 
meaning of grace is hinted at in the reference to ‘patience’ in the book’s title. 
Because human action is ambiguous, and because the final completion of all 
things can only be effected by God, patience will always be required of human 
beings in their search for the fullness of life that grace confers. Patience is thus 
an aspect of hope, and hope is an admission that grace is God’s gift and equally 
an acceptance of human beings’ own inability to produce salvation. 
 
 The stress on this-worldly existence that is evident in Laporte’s work can 
be found even more clearly represented in another study of grace emanating 
from North America.61 In it, James Carpenter recommends what, if one wished 
to avoid the term ‘pantheism’, might be described as a kind of ‘theological 
naturalism’. Carpenter’s approach, which prolongs the immanentist drift of 
much Catholic thought in the second half of the twentieth century, is reminiscent 
of, if not influenced by, process theology. For him, everything is ‘nature’, even 
man, and grace is everywhere in nature; the strict division which the 
Enlightenment introduced between man and nature should, in his view, be 
dissolved, and equally the excessive importance this move accorded to history, 
should also, he argues, be reduced. Social justice and justice towards nature are 
indeed, in this perspective, intertwined, almost interdependent. Both our 
explicitly ‘religious’ experience and our experience of nature form then, for 
Carpenter, part of a general experience of God’s revelation. Carpenter’s 
controversial thesis does, none the less, have an undeniable logic: if God is 
banished from nature, He disappears for us too, since we also are part of nature. 
While the logic is clear, the basic assumptions are somewhat less so. And even 
less clear, or at least equally arbitrary, would appear to be Carpenter’s 
suggestion that the whole drama of the creation and redemption of man perhaps 
only constitutes a tiny part of God’s total cosmic activity. 
59 Jean-Marc Laporte, Les Structures Dynamiques de la Grâce. Grâce médicinale et grâce 
élevante selon Thomas d’Aquin (Montréal: Bellarmin, 1973). 
60 Patience and Power: Grace for the First World (New York, 1988), a book S.J. Duffy’s 
review (Theological Studies, 50 [1989], 811–13) drew to my attention. 
61 James A. Carpenter, Nature and Grace: Toward an Integral Perspective (New York, 
1988), also reviewed by S.J. Duffy, Theological Studies, 50 (1989), 580-1. 
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 How should such, at first sight, new and rather startling ideas be assessed? 
It is undoubtedly true that the New Testament speaks about a cosmic liberation 
in Christ (cf. Rm 8: 18–23), but Carpenter does not appear to establish any 
specific link between redemption in Christ and God’s creative activity with 
respect to the cosmos, whereas the New Testament does make such a 
connection. Indeed, far from establishing such a link, Carpenter, as was just 
mentioned, seems to see the creation and redemption of man as fairly minor 
aspects of God’s overall activity. This somewhat quantitative approach to God’s 
relationship with his creation is not obviously in clear continuity with classical 
Christianity, which saw the incommensurability of God with respect to creation 
as providing an important key for interpreting the divine closeness to 
humanity.62 Even more significantly, Carpenter’s approach neglects the sense in 
which, for Christianity, redemption is, as it were, on a different, qualitative 
plane from creation, a point made explicitly by St John of the Cross,63 among 
others. In short, Carpenter appears to have adopted a position on grace that, 
whatever other strengths it might have, does not accommodate in any obvious 
sense fundamental aspects of the traditional doctrine. But Carpenter’s theology 
does appear to be symptomatic of a deep sea change that seems at present to be 
underway in Western Christianity. In concluding the second part of these 
reflections on grace, the question of what implicitly is at stake in a possible total 
jettisoning of significant elements of the classical interpretation of grace will be 
taken up. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
62 This point was memorably encapsulated in an epitaph composed anonymously for 
Ignatius of Loyola: Non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minimo, divinum est (‘Not 
to be encompassed by the greatest, but to let oneself be encompassed by the smallest – 
that is divine’), quoted in J. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, tr. J.R. Foster 
(London: 1968), 101. 
63 The formulation of the idea is of course much older. The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church informs us, for instance, that, ‘It is the opinion of St Augustine that “the 
justification of the wicked is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth”, 
because “heaven and earth will pass away but the salvation and justification of the 
elect . . . will not pass away”’ (CCC, §1994). St Augustine’s rhetoric may not explain 
too much, but it does at least reveal the relatively early acceptance of a real distinction 
between creation and redemption in the Christian Church. 
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 For the West, at any rate, it was the theology of Augustine that was 
perhaps the most decisive factor in shaping Christianity’s fundamental self-
understanding. The overpowering influence of Augustine may not be as strongly 
felt now as in former times, but his interpretation of the Christian faith, or what 
is left of it, is still – or was at any rate until the Enlightenment – the dominant, 
or at least the most coherent, view of Christianity in the West. It is not of course, 
and rarely – if ever – has been, without its critics, notably on the question of 
predestination. Yet even if the potentially predestinarian implications of 
Augustine’s teaching on grace could be ‘toned down’, the question of his 
intensely focused concentration on the redemption of fallen humanity through 
Christ as the heart of religious truth, will remain for many a stumbling-block. It 
would, however, be disingenuous, or at the very least erroneous, to imagine that 
the deficiencies of his ‘system’, if one accepts them as such, could ever be made 
good, and a more ‘balanced’ view of grace achieved, by combining the strengths 
of what he achieved with the strengths of what he neglected. It may be more 
realistic to suggest that the special position claimed for humanity by Judaism 
and, in an even more dramatic and circumscribed way, by Christianity 
(especially under the influence of Augustine) with its doctrines of incarnation, 
grace and redemption, will always appear suspect, or to be more precise, will 
always appear suspiciously self-serving, to a seemingly more reasonable, less 
excitable, more universal, and above all more immediately accessible religious 
sensibility, for which Neo-Platonism in the world of late antiquity may be taken 
to be symbolic, and which in the modern period could be said to have been 
reaffirmed in the theology of Schleiermacher. While it is surely impossible to be 
totally unresponsive to the religious charm of the vision of the cosmos 
represented by the ‘Platonism’ that was neglected by Augustine64 and, in 
64 In the new edition of his celebrated biography of St Augustine, Peter Brown points out 
how the ‘Platonism’ that was so vital for Augustine, was by no means the only 
‘Platonism’ available at that time, or even ‘necessarily the best’ (Peter Brown, 
Augustine of Hippo, new ed. [London: Faber and Faber, 2000], 503). Whereas 
Augustine fastened upon the aspects of Neo-Platonism that enabled him to explore the 
depths of human ‘inwardness’ or ‘interiority’ in ways that still speak to the 
contemporary world, there was also what Brown calls ‘polytheist Platonism’ (ibid.), 
from which Augustine turned away, in focusing attention relentlessly on the unum 
necessarium: ‘Augustine’s extraordinary capacity to construct from his reading of Neo-
Platonic material an entirely new sense of the inner life of the individual was achieved 
at a cost. He allowed the Platonic sense of the majesty of the cosmos to grow pale. Lost 
in the narrow and ever fascinating labyrinth of his preoccupation with the human will . . 
. , Augustine turned his back on the mundus, on the magical beauty associated with the 
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modern times, reinstated by Schleiermacher, yet time and again that charm has 
been unable, at least in the West, to overcome the more enduring appeal of 
human suffering. At those times, when the music of the cosmos is not 
convincing enough to enchant or seduce human beings into a celebration or even 
a mere acceptance of their lot, when the universe seems as empty of gods as of 
meaning, it is then that the attraction of the ‘impossible’, crucified God of 
Christianity can be most powerfully felt65 and the divine descent into the world 
of human desolation – the presence of grace – can be welcomed, with relief, as 
both ‘unimaginable’, and yet paradoxically, as the only appropriate response to 
the magnitude of human need. 
 
 Yet in tailoring Christianity exclusively to meet human need, as 
Augustine tended to do, in seeing divine grace primarily as the only effective 
medicine for fallen humanity, there is always of course the danger – acutely 
perceived, as we saw, in recent times by Balthasar – of conceiving God in the 
image of man, thus limiting God, or the equally real danger of special pleading, 
of inventing God for the convenience of man. It is then no doubt only a matter 
of time before the suspicion of ‘projectionism’ begins to cast its shadow over 
what Christianity claims to be the truth about the nature of reality. And this, it 
scarcely needs to be emphasised, is precisely what has occurred in the modern 
material universe in later Platonism’ (op. cit., 504). Brown’s judgement that, ‘The effect 
of a major breakthrough in the history of ideas is to block all alternative visions of the 
world’ (op. cit., 505) is a useful reminder of how light can blind as well as illuminate. 
65 The emphasis here is on ‘can’. From earliest Christian times, as the history of Docetism 
shows, the notion of a crucified God has for many been extremely problematic. A 
strong modern tradition, intensifying since the Enlightenment, rejects above all the 
Cross in Christianity. Goethe’s attitude to this nerve-centre of the Christian faith was 
deeply ambiguous (see the pertinent observations on Goethe’s ‘Christian Paganism’ in 
Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, tr. David E. Green [New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991], 20ff.), while his most ambitious nineteenth-century admirer, 
Nietzsche, notoriously made the notion of a crucified God a main focus of his attack on 
Christianity: ‘God on the Cross – is the fearful hidden meaning behind this symbol still 
not understood? – Everything that suffers, everything that hangs on the Cross, is divine. 
. . . We all hang on the Cross, consequently we are divine. . . . We alone are divine. . . .’ 
(The Anti-Christ, §51, tr. [modified] R.J. Hollingdale [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1990], 178f.). Negatively, as it were, Nietzsche is surely right. If the uniqueness of 
Christ’s divinity and humanity is not accepted, then the Cross can always be suspected 
of being ‘simply’ a potent, if ambiguous or even possibly pathological, symbol of the 
human condition, rather than a statement about God, and can then be dismissed as a 
projection of human need, a glorification of suffering, or even a grandiose example of 
human self-assertion, of no ‘objective’ significance. 
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world, with ever increasing force since Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity.66 It 
may, however, simply not be possible – and it may, as was said, be disingenuous 
to imagine it ever could be – to do justice both to the reality of the cosmos and 
to the Christian belief in the grace of redemption, in short to do justice to the 
orders of both creation and salvation, within the confines of any theological 
system, and it may only be possible, if at all, to do so at the level of living: ‘Man 
can embody truth but he cannot know it’,67 as Yeats’s wisdom has it. 
 
 But to neglect either main aspect of Christian teaching (either ‘creation’ 
or ‘redemption’), that is, to stress redemption in an almost Manichaean fashion 
to the exclusion, if not utter rejection or condemnation, of the entire created 
order, or to let cosmic religion absorb completely the meaning of the human 
search for redemption, such one-sided approaches to the presentation of the 
Christian faith will – if past experience is any guide to the future – scarcely be 
able to convey adequately the specificity of that faith. Rather, approaches of this 
undifferentiated kind will in all likelihood only lead either to the acceptance of a 
bleak, disenchanted naturalism (since a belief in redemption without a belief in 
creation will sooner or later appear so arbitrary as to be unsustainable), or else to 
the acceptance of a serene, not to say complacent, but for that very reason 
‘inhuman’ pantheism, just as distant from Christianity as naturalism. If one asks: 
‘How is pantheism “inhuman”?’, the answer can presumably only be because 
pantheism is unable to acknowledge or assert, as Christianity emphatically does, 
humanity’s special likeness to God, and God’s special concern for humanity—
an assertion which leaves open the possibility, excluded by pantheism, that 
humanity’s refusal to accept evil and suffering as reality’s ‘last word’ will one 
day be vindicated. It may have been the still not extinct cultural force of this 
conviction that prompted thinkers like Hobbes and Schopenhaur68 to dismiss 
pantheism as simply atheism in disguise, and more recently led Santayana to see 
in pantheism merely a ‘subterfuge for atheism’69 (a deeply ironic reversal of 
earlier times when Christians were accused of atheism by the guardians of 
Greco-Roman paganism). While this dismissal of pantheism itself no doubt begs 
many questions, it does none the less highlight, without of course necessarily 
66 Originally published in 1841; ET by George Eliot in 1854. 
67 Quoted in Joseph Hone, W.B. Yeats (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 480. 
68 Cf. M. Henry, On not understanding God (Dublin: The Columba Press, 1997), 39. 
69 Speaking of Santayana, Will Durant writes: ‘He will not permit himself the luxury of 
pantheism, which is merely a subterfuge for atheism; we add nothing to nature by 
calling it God’ (The Story of Philosophy [New York: Pocket Books, 1953], 494). 
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sharing them, what must surely remain the essential assumptions on which the 
Christian doctrine of grace rests, namely, belief in a transcendent distinction 
between God and creation, belief in humanity’s special position within that 
creation, and belief, finally, in the correspondingly unique connection between 
the human and the divine. How that connection might now be interpreted will be 
the subject of the concluding part of this study.70
70 The concluding part of this study of grace is to appear in the next issue of the ITQ. 
